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290 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2002)
L Inv&dra
Michael Lee Fullwood ("Fullwood") and Diedre Waters ("Waters") were in
a relationship for over three years and shared a daughter, Michelle. In 1985, the
relationship began to dissolve and Fullwood began threatening to kill Waters.
On March 29,1985, the strain in the relationship culminated in a bloody killing.
Waters was employed as a day care worker for Michael ("Mr. Hawks?) and
Camille Hawks ("Mrs. Hawks"). Before Mrs. Hawks left for work that day,
Waters received phone calls from Fullwood and his mother. Waters told Full-
wood's mother that she took a warrant out on Fullwood because he was threat-
ening to cut off her head and to cut out her heart. An hour after Mrs. Hawks left
the house, Robin Ferrell ("Ferrell") arrived at the day care to drop off her child.
Ferrell tried to open the front door, but found it locked. She noticed that the
window was broken,'and she heard the children crying. Ferrell called Mrs.
Hawks and was able to get the children out of the house through the window.2
Mr. Hawks returned to the house. He and Ferrell went into the house and
found Waters, "completely covered with blood," lying dead on the living room
floor.3 Fullwood lay across her lap. The police found blood from Fullwood and
Waters all over the house. The autopsy on Waters's body revealed twenty. four
wounds, mostly slash wounds, two of which were capable of causing death.
Fullwood was in shock upon arrival in the emergency room. He had a stab
wound in his abdomen and superficial cuts on his wrists and neck The doctor
treating Fullwood believed that the wounds were self-inflicted.4
During the guilt phase of the trial, the State alleged that Fullwood broke into
the house despite Waters's attempts to prevent him from entering. Waters
struggled to keep Fulwood awayfrom her, but eventuallyhe managed to stab her
to death. The defense conceded that Fullwood killed Waters and requested "a
verdict of guilty of second degree murder." Defense counsel asserted that
Fullwood was emotionallytroubled, that Waters stabbed him, and that he did not
"premeditate or deliberate" the killing.6 The psychologist for the defense testi-
fied that Fullwood's IQ was low and that Waters and Michelle were "the founda-
1. Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 671 (4th Gr. 2002).
2. Id at 671-72.
3. Id at 672.
4. Id at 672-73.
5. Id at 673.
6. id
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tion of [Fullwood's] life." The defense argued that Fullwood could not handle
"his perception" that Waters was leaving him and taking their daughter with her.!
The jury found Fullwood guilty of first-degree murder. In the sentencing
phase, the jury determined that the State proved the presence of the "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor and that the seven mitigating
factors did not outweigh the aggravating factor, and therefore recommended a
sentence of death! On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
affirmed Fullwood's conviction and sentence.9 The United States Supreme Court
vacated Fullwood's sentence and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina for reconsideration On remand, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that the jury was given improper instructions and remanded the
case for a new capital sentencing proceeding. At the resentencing hearing, the
jury decided that the aggravating factor was present and that the mitigating
circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating factor. Fullwood appealed his
sentence and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the sentence. The
United States Supreme Court denied Fullwood's petition for a writ of certiorari. 0
Fullwood filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief ("MAR") in state court
seeking post-conviction relief. The Buncombe CountySuperior Court concluded
that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary and denied Fullwood's request.
Fullwood petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a writ of certiorari
to reviewthe state court's denial, but was rejected. Fullwood then petitioried the
federal district court for relief. The district court determined that the issues
Fullwood raised did not necessitate a hearing."
Fullwood appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit raising five claims for relief. Fullwood contended that he was not given
a fair trial at his resentencing, as guaranteed bythe Due Process Clause, because
the jury was subject to improper contact with third parties and considered
extraneous information that neither was introduced at trial, nor provided bythe
court.12 Fullwood also argued that the State, violating Brady v Marmjr," failed
to disclose to the defense one of Fullwood's statements to the police. 4 Full-
wood's third argument was that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorneyhad a conflict of interest." Fourth, Fullwood asserted that
7. Fulki* 290 F3d at 673.
8. Id at 673-74; se N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(e)(9) (2001).
9. FuY 290 F3d at 674.
10. Id at 674-75.
11. Id at 675.
12. Id
13. 373 US. 83 (1963).
14. Fllumxg 290 F.3d at 684; seeBradyv. Maiyland, 373 U.S. 83,87(1963) (holding "that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
15. Fu//voAr 290 F.3d at 687. One of Fullwood's original attorneys subsequentlybecame an
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the trial court's exclusion of mitigating evidence on state evidentiary grounds
resulted in a constitutional error. 6 Finally, Fullwood argued that "the jury
instructions were unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment.""
II. Hdding
The Fourth Grcuit partiallyreversed the district court's order."8 Specifically,
the court found the following: (1) that Fullwood was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing based on an assertion that a juror was influenced by her husband in
voting for the death sentence; and (2) that Fullwood was entitled to an investiga-
tion, in the evidentiaryhearing, of allegations that the juryconsidered extraneous
information regarding Fullwood's prior death sentence." The court affirmed the
district court's denial of a writ for the remaining claims." Fullwood failed to
prove a violation of his rights regarding the jury's speculation that any decision
it made would be appealed and the likelihood that Fullwood would be entitled
to parole if a life sentence was recommended." Fullwood also failed to show
that the state court's decision regarding his Brady claim was contrary to law.
Fullwood's conflict of interest/ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed
because he presented no evidence showing that the conflicted attorney had
worked on his resentencing.23 Neither did Fullwood demonstrate that the
exclusion of his mother's testimony about his brother's death affected the jury's
sentence.24 Lastly, the jury instructions used were constitutionally sufficient
under prior precedent."
III. A nzl sis
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating that the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury.26 A failure
to afford such a jury results in a violation of due process.' The United States
Supreme Court stated that Sixth Amendment concerns are raised when private
assistant district attorney in the office that prosecuted his second sentencing hearing. Id
16. Id at 691.
17. Id. at 693.
18. Id at 675.
19. Id at 671.
20. Id at 683-84.
21. FuUvUIY 290 F.3d at 695.
22. Id at 687.
23. Id at 690.
24. Id at 693.
25. 1d at 694.
26. Id at 677; US. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedyand public trial, byan impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shaU have been committed.').
27. Fu/u/XZ* 290 F.3d at 677.
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communications take place between a juror and an outside party." These
communications are suspicious because they are not subject to "'full judicial
protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and
of counsel." 29 "Extrajudicial remarks" may interfere with the defendant's right
to a fair trial3
The Fourth Circuit stated that habeas relief will be granted if the jury
misconduct had a "'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict."'' If the court is in "'grave doubt' as to the harmlessness of
an error, the habeas petitioner must prevail."' 2 The Fourth Circuit clarified that
"grave doubt" is present when the court is in "'virtual equipose"' as to the
harmlessness of the error." The Fourth Circuit relied on this standard to
evaluate Fullwood's claim. Fuliwood supported his claim with the post-trial
affidavit of a juror, Laura Booth ("Booth"), who served on the resentencing
jury? Booth's affidavit included allegations that the Fourth C(iiuit divided into
two categories: (1) "undue influence or pressure upon a juror bjr a nonjuror,"
and (2) jury consideration "of information not presented by the parties or the
court during trial."' The court analyzed each claim sequentially.
36
A. Thini Party Iqt or Pmsur
Fullwood relied on Booth's affidavit to allege that a juror, Joyce Austin
("Austin"), was "stronglyinfluenced by... her husband [who] was stronglypro-
death penalty."37 According to the affidavit, Austin told jurymembers, through-
out the trial and during deliberations, that her husband told her to convict
Fullwood and sentence him to death. Booth also opined that the pressure
Austin's husband placed upon her caused Austin to vote for death.39 Fullwood
contended that this third partyinfluence affected the jury's deliberations because
it resulted in one juror choosing a sentence of death.' In the alternative, Full-
wood argued that because he presented evidence showing that a juror was
28. Id (citing Parker v. Gladden, 385 US. 363, 364 (1966)).
29. Id (quoting Paeer, 385 US. at 364).
30. Id
31. Id at 679 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 365 (4th Gr. 1998)).
32. Id (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 US. 432, 436 (1995)).
33. FtUd/. 290 F.3d at 679 (quoting ONad, 513 US. at 435).





39. Fu/! ur, 290 F.3d at 676.
40. id
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subjected to third partyopinions, he was entitled to an evidentiaryhearing on this
issue."'
The Fourth Careuit determined that the Booth affidavit could not be used
to impeach the jury.42 The court stated that in past cases the court has held that
"'a Juror's mental process in connection with the verdict'" cannot be relied upon
to invalidate a sentence." Ajuror maytestifyto whether outside information was
received bythe jury or whether prejudicial information was brought to the jury's
attention." North Carolina law imposes these same rules with regard to juror
testimony used to impeach a verdict.4 The Fourth Circuit rejected Fullwood's
argument that he introduced evidence that an improper external influence
resulted in a death sentence and that he was entitled to habeas relief.'
The Fourth Circuit examined whether Fullwood was entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing based on the allegation that Austin was influenced to vote for the
death penalty by her husband.47 The court stated that a district court is not
permitted to grant an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner did not "'develop the
factual basis of a claim' in state court unless certain statutory requirements are
satisfied."48 The Fourth Circuit reiterated that the district court is permitted to
hold an evidentiary hearing if "'the petitioner alleges additional facts that, if true,
would entitle him to relief."' 49 Petitioner must also establish one of six factors
stated in Tormerd v Sai s°
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Fullwood satisfied at least one of the
Toumnzdfactors because he raised allegations of improper external influences on
the juryand was not afforded a hearing on the issue.5' The court determined that
Fullwood alleged facts indicating that he may have been denied twelve impartial
jurors. 2 That allegation might entitle him to relief. 3 The court remanded the
issue for an evidentiary hearing on whether the contact between Austin and her
41. Id
42. Id at 680.
43. Id at 679-80 (quoting United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 143 (4th Cr. 1996)).
44. Id at 680 (quoting FED. P. EVID. 606(b)).
45. Flluotx 290 F3d at 680; N.C GEN. STAT. S 15A- 1240 (2001) (stating that "no evidence
may be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event, or condition upon the mind
of a juror or concerning the mental processes by which the verdict was determined").
46. Fu/!g 290 F3d at 680.
47. Id at 680-81.
48. Id at 681 (quoting 28 US.CA. S 2254(e)(2) (2002)).
49. Id (quoting McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 598 (4th Or. 2000)).
50. Id; Townsend v. Sain, 372 US. 293, 313 (1963) (stating six factors, one of which
petitioner must establish to receive an evidentiary hearing).





husband denied Fullwood a fair trial and had a "substantial and injurious effect"
on the verdict. s4
B. If'wicm Nct JP'mn i by &e Pan z or & Cm
Fullwood relied on the Booth affidavit to argue that the jury had become
aware that he was sentenced to death previously and that the original death
sentence was reversed because of technicalities."5 The Fourth ircuit held that
this allegation implicated Fullwood's Sixth Amendment right "to an impartial jury
that arrives at a verdict based upon the evidence developed at trial.'" 6 The court
stated that Fullwood's allegations must showthat "extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion" was improperly presented to the jury and whether the information "'had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'""
The Fourth Circuit determined that Fullwood made a sufficient showing
that the facts were "extraneous, prejudicial" and improper, therefore warranting
an evidentiary hearing."3 Although Fullwood did not specify the source of the
facts, the Fourth Cruit concluded that the information was "extraneous"
because it was not disclosed during trial and was not general information the
jurors would possess. 9 The Fourth Circuit concluded that during Fullwood's
evidentiary hearing, the district court should "explore" Fullwood's allegations
that the juryconsidered prejudicial information not introduced during tria.6° The
Fourth ircuit decided that the insufficiency of the facts did not allow for a
determination of whether the facts "had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict," and therefore, the district court must
also develop this issue during the evidentiary hearing.
61
C Geral Qrsik Ijom n
Fullwood supported his claim with two additional allegations found in
Booth's affidavit, including that the jurydiscussed Fullwood's right to appeal and
his parole eligibility.62 The Fourth ircuit determined that Fullwood did not
make a sufficient showing on this issue to entitle him to an evidentiaryhearing.63
The court found that the information regarding the jury's awareness that Full-
wood would appeal any decision imposed was "commonly known informa-
54. 1d at 682.
55. Id
56. Id (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 US. 717, 722 (1961)).




61. Id at 683.
62. Id
63. Ful/4 290 F3d at 683.
[Vol. 15:1
FULL WOOD V LEE
tion." 6 As well, the court stated that since Booth had an extensive legal back-
ground, she was knowledgeable about the legal process. 5 Fullwood failed to
showthat the juryleamed about Fullwood's possible parole fm canasideswoe
dwrbV trYi" or from Booth.66 The court concluded that this information did not
qualify as "extraneous matter" because almost all jurors have preconceived
notions about the legal process."' Therefore, the Fourth Orctit concluded that
Fullwood was not entitled to relief "on his Sixth Amendment claim that the jury
improperly considered his parole eligibility and the possibility that he might
appeal. 6
IV. Appliaaw in Viia
The Fourth Crcuit reiterated principles upheld by the Supreme Court
relating to jury misconduct and potentially questionable verdicts. Counsel in
Fu/!codacted correctly byconducting post-trial interviews of the jury members.
The importance of jury polling or post-trial interviews of jurors is evidenced in
Poudlv Q rr .69 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed Powell's capital
conviction for murder based on robbery because polling of the jurors after the
guilt phase established that the jury had relied on the rape predicate.'0 It is
essential that capital defense practitioners request that the jurybe polled on more
than the basic verdict. In the event of alternative capital predicates in the indict-
ment, polling can be used to identify the predicate supporting the conviction.
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Fullwood was not entitled to relief on
his claim that the "jury improperly considered his parole eligibility and the
possibility that he might appeal," is questionable in light of SrtYnm VScrub
QdinWt and Slifer v Scba Candim In Sifer, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized the holding of Simm: the jury should be instruc that life
means life without the possibility of parole when the defendant is parole ineligi-
ble and juryunderstanding of parole eligibility is paramount. 3 The jurs confu-
64. Id at 683-84.




69. Powell v. Commonwealth, 552 S1E.2d 344, 355-63 (Va. 2001) (reversing defendant's
capital murder conviction on multiple grounds, including that trial court gave incorrect instruction
concerning gradation offense of rape).
70. Id at 356-57. The jurors stated that they relied upon the gradation offense of rape for
the capital offense. Id at 352.
71. 512 US. 154 (1994).
72. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154, 169 (1994) (holding that the jury should be
instructed life means life without the possibility of parole when the defendant is parole ineligible);
Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 US. 36, 53-54 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of the jury's
understanding of parole eligibility).
73. SIaw, 532 US. at 39, 53-54.
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sion regarding parole eligibility, as was the case in FuU/w! must be addressed by
the courts.74 Although S/hfr does not directly act Virginia capital defense
because in Virginia an instruction on parole bility is required, it does
emphasize the importance of juryunderstanding on tis matterr." InFu/lhxrl the
Fourth Circuit stated that, absent particular allegations of misconduct, informa-
tion regarding juror understanding of parole is considered "internal discussions"
and cannot be used to impeach a verdict. 6 Practitioners should rely on Shafer
and continue to request a Smnm instruction, to ensure that the juryis instructed
that life means life without the possibility of parole.
The Fourth Crcuit, in this case, clarified rules governing the use of juror
affidavits as acceptable forms of evidence when impeaching a verdict.7 The
court previously stated that "a party seeking to invalidate a verdict may not rely
upon evidence of 'a juror's mental process in connection with the verdict" s and
that jurors cannot testify as to the "mental processes in connection therewith." 9
Thus, the Booth affidavit relied on by Fullwood was rejected by the Fourth
Cicuit and did not entitle him to habeas relief.' Practitioners should note that
the Fourth Ctrcuit allowed the use of affidavits to make allegations that the jury
considered outside information not introduced during trial." The court stated
that allegations of this nature implicate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to
an impartial jury that arrives at a verdict 'based upon the evidence developed at
trial'" and thus entitled Fullwood to an evidentiary hearing. 2
V. Caiwwn
In summary, Fullfuod may be used by Virginia capital defense lawyers for
three purposes. To combat defects in the jury process, practitioners should
always request that the jury be polled or request to conduct post-trial jury inter-
views. Second, a request should be made that the jury be instructed that life
means life without parole, and attention should be given to the jurys understand-
ing of parole ineligibility. Finally, capital defense lawyers must be clear on the use
of affidavits to attack verdicts. Practitioners may introduce this evidence know-
ing that it may not impeach the verdict, but it may afford the defendant an
evidentiary hearing on other issues.
Ptiya Nath
74. SwKathryn Roe Ekiridge, Case Note, 14 CAP.DEF.J. 89,92 (2001) (analyzing Shafer v.
South Carolina, 121 S. C. 1263 (2001)).
75. Id at 91.
76. FuUrxxi 290 F.3d at 684.
77. Id at 679-80.
78. Id at 680 (quoting Cba, 94 F.3d at 143).
79. Id (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)).
80. Id
81. Id at 682.
82. Fu/mUX 290 F.3d at 682 (quoting In/, 366 US. at 722).
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